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We propose a model of endogeneous beliefs formation, leading to subjective and hetero-
geneous beliefs. Beliefs are considered as a strategic variable that agents can manipulate
to maximize their utility from trade. Our framework is therefore an imperfect competi-
tion framework, and the underlying concept is the concept of Nash equilibrium. In such a
strategic setting, the objective belief is not optimal and agents di⁄er in their optimal beliefs.
Optimism (resp. overcon￿dence) as well as pessimism (resp. doubt) both emerge as optimal
beliefs. There is a positive correlation between pessimism (resp. doubt) and risk tolerance.
The consensus belief is pessimistic and, as a consequence, the risk premium is higher than
in a standard setting. Our model is embedded in a standard ￿nancial markets equilibrium
problem and the strategic mechanism can be applied to several other situations (optimal
recommendations for in￿uential investors or gurus, choice of an optimal retention rate for an
insurance company, choice of the optimal proportion of equity to retain for an entrepreneur
and for a given project).
1Strategic beliefs
Abstract
We propose a model of endogeneous beliefs formation, leading to subjective and hetero-
geneous beliefs. Beliefs are considered as a strategic variable that agents can manipulate to
maximize their utility from trade. Our framework is therefore an imperfect competition frame-
work, and the underlying concept is the concept of Nash equilibrium. In such a strategic setting,
the objective belief is not optimal and agents di⁄er in their optimal beliefs. Optimism (resp.
overcon￿dence) as well as pessimism (resp. doubt) both emerge as optimal beliefs. There is a
positive correlation between pessimism (resp. doubt) and risk tolerance. The consensus belief
is pessimistic and, as a consequence, the risk premium is higher than in a standard setting.
Our model is embedded in a standard ￿nancial markets equilibrium problem and the strategic
mechanism can be applied to several other situations (optimal recommendations for in￿uential
investors or gurus, choice of an optimal retention rate for an insurance company, choice of the
optimal proportion of equity to retain for an entrepreneur and for a given project).
21 Introduction
In the classical ￿nancial economics theory, decision makers are assumed to have homogenous and
rational expectations. This assumption has been the basis for many developments in ￿nance.
Among these developments, the portfolio selection model (Markowitz, 1952) and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965) play an important role. Given their
simplicity and empirical tractability, these models and their subsequent extensions have become
a signi￿cant cornerstone of theoretical and applied economics from insurance and ￿nancial
theory to the theory of the ￿rm.
However, the last 30 years have seen an accumulation of empirical tests that invalidate the
theoretical conclusions of these models based on rational expectations. The homogeneous prior
beliefs assumption (Harsanyi doctrine) is weaker than the assumption of rational expectations
that all agents￿ prior beliefs are equal to the objective probabilities. But like rational expec-
tations, the common priors assumption is quite restrictive and does not allow agents to ￿agree
to disagree￿ (Aumann, 1976). It su¢ces to observe the heterogeneity of analysts or profes-
sional forecasters forecasts or more generally of experts opinions to realize that this assumption
is not realistic. Savage (1954) provides axiomatic foundations for a more general theory in
which agents hold arbitrary prior beliefs, so agents can agree to disagree. But the alternative
to rational expectations lacks discipline and if beliefs can be arbitrary, theory provides little
structure or predictive power. Indeed, once relaxed the assumption of rational and homoge-
nous expectations, arise the following questions: How do agents form their beliefs? Do beliefs
exhibit optimism? pessimism? overcon￿dence? doubt? How are these possible biases related
to the agents preferences? How are agents￿ beliefs a⁄ected by strategic interaction? What is
the impact of these beliefs or expectations on individual decisions? What is the impact of these
beliefs on equilibrium characteristics such as prices, risk premium and risk-sharing?
We provide a discipline for beliefs formation through a model of strategic beliefs. More
precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can manipulate to maximize their
utility from trade. Our aim is to provide a rationale for beliefs subjectivity and heterogeneity
that enlightens the re￿exion about the questions above.
Several models in economics study models in which forward-looking agents optimally distort
beliefs (Akerlof-Dickens, 1982, Brunnermeier-Parker, 2005, Gollier-Muerman, 2006). In all these
models, the beliefs result from an individual optimization problem while our model of beliefs
3formation is strategic. In our model, we do not impose a speci￿c mental process linked to
anticipatory feelings like Methode CouØ, positive or wishful thinking, fear of disappointment,
and leading systematically to a given behavioral bias.
More precisely, we suppose that agents choose strategic beliefs, so that the associated de-
mand is optimal in the sense of a Nash equilibrium in demands, as presented in Kyle (1989).
Each player can choose a belief to maximize his utility from trade, taking into account the e⁄ect
his choice has on price and taking as given the strategy of the other players. We will consider
two situations that lead in fact to the same conclusions. In the ￿rst situation, the set of players
corresponds to the set of all investors. The adopted imperfect competition approach is then
particularly signi￿cant when there is a small number of investors. This is the case, for instance,
in reinsurance markets or private equity markets. This is also the case in stock markets when
the capital is highly concentrated or in markets for ￿nancial products that require a high level
of technicality. We can also argue that ￿the real issue is not so much how many investors there
are, but to what extent investors cluster in their beliefs￿ [Shefrin, 2005, p216]. This is why we
also consider a second situation where the players are "gurus" (in￿uential investors, newsletters
writers,...). Like in Benabou-Laroque (2001), the "guru" we have in mind ￿issues forecats but
is also in the business of trading, for his own account or some investment ￿rm.￿ The following
example quoted by Benabou-Laroque (2001) ￿provides the most dramatic illustration of prices
reacting to someone￿s announcement￿
In the nervous market of 1987, Mr Prechter has emerged as both prophet and deity,
an adviser whose advice reaches so many investors that he tends to pull the market
the way he has predicted it will move [International Herald Tribune, October 3,
1987]
In our model, each investor adopts the announced belief of one guru. This corresponds to the
￿ndings of Fisher and Statman where it appears that ￿there is a positive relationship between
changes in the sentiment of individual investors and that of newsletter writers￿. The gurus
choose their "beliefs" strategically taking into account the impact of their announced beliefs
on other agents hence on prices. For credibility reasons they act according to their announced
beliefs. In both situations, the strategic beliefs are not true beliefs in the sense that they don￿t
correspond to what the players truly believe but to how they behave. We consider them as
beliefs because they might be interpreted as such by econometricians who observe portfolio
4choices. They are also interpreted as such in the model with gurus by the investors that adopt
gurus￿ beliefs.
Our ￿ndings are the following. First, a strategic behavior leads to beliefs subjectivity and
heterogeneity. This means that in a standard portfolio/equilibrium problem in which agents are
allowed to manipulate their beliefs, the objective belief is not optimal, and agents di⁄er in their
optimal beliefs. Indeed, optimism (resp. overcon￿dence) as well as pessimism (resp. doubt)
both emerge as optimal beliefs. Furthermore, we ￿nd a positive correlation between pessimism
(resp. doubt) and risk tolerance. The intuition is as follows. For a very risk tolerant agent, his
demand in the risky asset is positive, so that his expected utility from trade is decreasing in
the price of the risky asset. The choice of a pessimistic belief is associated to a lower demand,
hence to a lower price, and the optimal belief balances this bene￿t of pessimism against the
costs of worse decision making. The converse reasoning applies to a very risk averse agent, who,
at the equilibrium, has a negative demand in the risky asset and bene￿ts from optimism. As
a consequence of this positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance, there is less
risk sharing and the volume of trade is decreased compared to the standard setting. The same
applies for doubt.
Second, the representative agent belief, or the consensus belief, which is given by the average
of the individual beliefs weighted by the risk tolerance, is pessimistic. Intuitively, the more risk
tolerant agents make the market, and the consensus belief re￿ects the characteristics of the
more risk tolerant. Since we have just seen that the more risk tolerant are pessimistic, it is
consistent to obtain a pessimistic consensus belief. Moreover, the average (unweighted) belief is
also pessimistic, which means that the pessimistic risk tolerant agents are more pessimistic than
the optimistic and there is then a pessimistic bias in individual beliefs. Such a pessimistic bias
is also obtained in empirical studies in a purely behavioral setting (Ben Mansour et al., 2006),
in a decision theory framework (Wakker, 2001) or in a market framework (Giordani-S￿derlind,
2006). In particular, as underlined by Shefrin (2005) based on Wall $treet Week data ￿between
1983 and 2002, professional investors were unduly pessimistic, underestimating market returns￿.
As a consequence of the pessimistic bias at the aggregate level, the risk premium is greater
than in the standard rational expectations equilibrium. The fact that a pessimistic bias and
a positive correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism lead to an increase of the market
price of risk has been underlined by Abel (1989), Calvet et al. (2002), Detemple-Murthy (1994),
Gollier (2007) and Jouini-Napp (2006); in their models, beliefs are exogenously given.
5This increase of the market price of risk is interesting in light of the risk-premium puzzle on
￿nancial markets. In the insurance industry, our results lead to a situation where the more risk
averse agent (the insured) is optimistic and the less risk averse agent (the insurer) is pessimistic.
The average belief is pessimistic leading to a higher insurance premium, which might help to
explain the purchase of vastly overpriced insurance in a range of situations (Cutler-Zeckhauser,
2004). In corporate ￿nance, IPO￿s can be modeled as a decision for a risk averse entrepreneur
to sell shares of his ￿rm to more risk tolerant investors. The application of our results to such
a setting leads to a pessimistic consensus belief. As a result, the ￿rm is underpriced and the
short run return is large, which is consistent with the empirical literature on IPO￿s (Ibbotson
and Ritter, 1995). Obviously, we don￿t pretend that strategic interaction, such as in our simple
model, is the unique explanation for these puzzles, however, it is interesting to remark that our
model helps to explain these puzzles as well as beliefs heterogeneity without introducing any
information asymmetry.
Our results obtained in a strategic interaction framework di⁄er from those obtained in an
optimal beliefs/illusions setting, in which there is no beliefs heterogeneity and an optimistic
bias1 (Brunnermeier-Parker, 2005, Gollier, 2005). This bias results from the speci￿c mental
process they consider. Indeed, in these models, subjective beliefs maximize the agents expected
well-being de￿ned as the time average of expected felicity over all periods. Since agents that
care about future utility ￿ows have a higher current felicity if they are optimistic, the optimal
beliefs balance this bene￿t of optimism against the costs of worse decision making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and discusses the mechanism of
strategic beliefs in a simple setting. Secion 3 generalizes the model to a market with N players
and considers both the case of a small number of investors and the case of a large number of
investors but a small number of in￿uential investors/gurus. Section 4 provides extensions and
generalizations of the model in order to take into account more general utility functions and
payo⁄s distributions. It also extends the results to a framework with more than one asset.
Section 5 compares strategic beliefs characteristics with those of optimal beliefs (Brunnermeier-
Parker, 2005, Gollier-Muerman, 2006). All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
1Gollier-Muerman (2006) consider a model of optimal beliefs with ex ante savoring and ex post disappointment.
Depending upon the intensity of anticipatory feelings and disappointment they might also obtain a systematic
pessimsistic bias.
62 The mechanism of strategic beliefs
In this section, we describe in a simple setting the mechanism of strategic beliefs.
We consider a standard equilibrium model, except that we allow strategic interaction to
be incorporated into the analysis. More precisely, we assume that the economy is composed
of two agents, who di⁄er in their level of risk aversion. The agents live for one period and
consumption takes place at the end of the period. There is a single risky asset in the economy,
whose payo⁄ at the end of the period is denoted by e x: We let p denote the unit price of the
risky asset, which means that both agents can sell their property rights on the risky asset
against the delivery of the sure quantity p at the end of the period. We assume that the agents
have the same endowment, which consists of a half unit of the risky asset. As in the standard
portfolio problem, agents determine the optimal composition of their portfolio, in other words
their optimal exposure to the risk. The di⁄erence with the standard model stems from the
fact that agents take into account their impact on prices and can manipulate their beliefs to
take advantage of this impact. For example, an agent, who is risk tolerant, hence willing to
be quite highly exposed to the risk, or equivalently interested in buying a high quantity of the
risky asset, could act as if he believed that the asset was less interesting (or as if he were less
interested in buying the asset) in order to bene￿t from a lower price.
We are interested in the characteristics of this economy at the (Nash) equilibrium. More
precisely, we are interested in the following questions. Does this model of strategic beliefs
lead to subjectivity in optimal beliefs? Does it generate heterogeneous beliefs? Is there a
link between risk tolerance and optimal belief and what is the nature of this link? Is there a
pessimistic/optimistic bias at the individual as well as at the collective level ? What are the
consequences on the equilibrium characteristics and in particular on the risk premium ?
In this section, agents have CARA utility functions for consumption, more precisely, u1 (c) =
￿exp￿ c
￿1 and u2 (c) = ￿exp￿ c
￿2; where ￿i > 0 denotes the degree of risk tolerance of agent i.
Moreover, we assume that e x is normally distributed, with mean ￿ and variance ￿2.
In the competitive Walrasian equilibrium model, an equilibrium price is such that agents
reach optimal demands and markets clear. More precisely, the optimal demand ￿i(p) of the









7The optimal demand is then given by ￿i (p) = ￿i
￿￿p
￿2 : The market clearing condition ￿1 (p) +
￿2 (p) = 1 imposes then that the equilibrium price of the risky asset is given by p￿ = ￿￿ ￿2
￿1+￿2:
Moreover, we obtain that the optimal demand at the equilibrium is given by ￿￿
i = ￿i(p￿) = ￿i
￿1+￿2
so that the agent with a higher (resp. lower) risk tolerance level has a positive (resp. negative)
demand in e x and the part of the risk beared by agent i is exactly given by his relative level of
risk tolerance.
As a simple extension of this model, we can consider the case in which agents have heteroge-
neous expectations about the payo⁄ of the risky asset, i.e., agent 1 believes that e x is normal with
mean ￿1 and variance ￿2 and agent 2 believes that e x is normal with mean ￿2 and variance ￿2
with2 ￿1 6= ￿2: The optimal demand of agent i given price p is then given by ￿i (p;￿i) = ￿i
￿i￿p
￿2 .











which is the equilibrium price in an economy in which agents share the same expectations given
by
￿1￿1+￿2￿2
￿1+￿2 . In other words, the equilibrium price in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs is
the equilibrium price in an economy in which the belief of the representative agent (whose risk
tolerance ￿ is given, as in the standard setting, by the sum of the individual risk tolerances) is
given by the average of the heterogeneous beliefs, weighted by the risk tolerance. Moreover, we
obtain that the optimal demand ￿￿
i of agent i at the equilibrium is given by
￿￿









and the part of the risk beared by agent i depends upon both his level of risk tolerance and his
belief: Letting RP (resp. RPstdd) denote the risk premium ￿ ￿ p in this setting (resp. in the

















which means that the risk premium in an economy with heterogeneous subjective beliefs is higher
than in the standard rational expectations setting if and only if the belief of the representative
2Walrasian equilibrium models with heterogeneous beliefs have been studied, among others, by Williams
(1977), Abel (1989), Detemple-Murthy (1994), Calvet et al. (2002), Jouini-Napp (2006).
8agent, which is the risk tolerance weighted average of the individual beliefs, is pessimistic, where
pessimistic is meant in the sense that the mean of the risky asset￿s payo⁄ is underestimated. In
such a setting, it is particularly interesting to explore when and why individuals are pessimistic,
as well as the nature of the link between risk tolerance and pessimism. In the present paper,
the individual subjective beliefs are determined endogenously and we analyze their properties,
especially in terms of pessimism, correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance and impact
on the risk premium.
Instead of assuming that the equilibrium is a competitive one, we consider agents who act
as imperfect competitors and take into account explicitly the e⁄ect their trading has on price.
More precisely, as in Kyle (1989) in a setting with asymmetric information, each agent chooses a
demand schedule to maximize his utility from pro￿ts, taking into account his e⁄ect on prices by
considering as given the strategy the other agent uses to choose his demand schedule. This leads
to the notion of Nash equilibrium in demand schedules3. We shall consider demand schedules
of a speci￿c form. We assume that the strategic variable for the agents consists in their belief
about the expected payo⁄ of the risky asset, i.e. the mean of the random variable e x: By changing
his strategic belief on the mean of e x; the agent changes both the quantity he trades and the
market clearing price at which he trades that quantity. Indeed, as we have seen above, the
equilibrium price in a setting with heterogeneous beliefs and the optimal trading quantities are
given by Equations (1) and (2):
The choice of a belief b ￿i taking the belief ￿j of agent j as given is then determined by the
maximization of the utility level






















We emphasize that the choice of a given belief b ￿ is strategic: as in a rational expectations
equilibrium, the agent knows that the true mean of e x is ￿ but he behaves as if he truly believed
that it is b ￿ in order to take advantage of his impact on prices and to maximize his utility from
pro￿ts. Next section will provide situations where the choice of the beliefs as a strategic variable
is natural.
3As underlined by Kyle ￿(this) is perhaps the most obvious modi￿cation of the conventional competitive
rational expectations concept. It preserves market clearing through a Walrasian mechanism and keeps the Nash
￿avour of a competitive equilibrium.￿ In fact, the concept of Nash equilibrium in demand schedules is the
analogon, from the consumers point of view, of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in supply for producers.
9De￿nition 1 A Nash equilibrium in beliefs (on the mean) is de￿ned as a pair of strategies on
the mean M = (b ￿1;b ￿2) such that for any other pair of strategies M0 di⁄ering only in the i-th






























The construction of endogenous subjective beliefs that are solutions of a given utility max-
imization problem has been considered in recent literature by Brunnermeier-Parker (2005),
Gollier (2005), Gollier-Muerman (2006). In our framework, the subjective beliefs are not only
optimal but strategic. Indeed, they do not result from an individual utility maximization prob-
lem but from a Nash equilibrium, in which each agent takes into account the impact of his
choices on the equilibrium price and allocations. In a non-strategic setting where agents choose
their belief in order to maximize a criterion related to their well-being, it is immediate that the
optimal belief must be optimistic for all agents and that all agents select a riskier portfolio. In
our setting, there is no such immediate intuition for a given systematic bias. A more detailed
comparison between the optimal beliefs approach and the strategic beliefs approach is provided
in Section 4.
Proposition 1 In a model with two agents, exponential utility functions and normal distribu-
tions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in beliefs (on the mean). It satis￿es the following
properties.
1. The optimal beliefs M = (b ￿1;b ￿2) are given by
b ￿1 = ￿ ￿
￿2
4￿2 (￿1 + ￿2)
(￿1 ￿ ￿2); b ￿2 = ￿ ￿
￿2
4￿1 (￿1 + ￿2)
(￿2 ￿ ￿1): (4)
The more risk tolerant agent is pessimistic, in the sense that he behaves as if the mean
of e x lied below its true value, and the less risk tolerant agent is optimistic. Moreover, the
more risk tolerant agent is more pessimistic than the less risk tolerant agent is optimistic
and the unweighted average of the beliefs is pessimistic:









2. The representative agent is pessimistic, i.e. the average of the individual beliefs weighted
10by the risk tolerance is pessimistic. More precisely,







￿1￿2 (￿1 + ￿2)
(6)
3. The risk premium RP (resp. the price) is higher (resp. lower) than in the standard rational
expectations equilibrium. More precisely
RP = RPstdd +
￿
￿ ￿








￿1￿2 (￿1 + ￿2)
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which means that the volumes of trade (and the risk sharing) are reduced compared to the
standard setting. The more risk tolerant (resp. risk averse) agent selects a less (resp.
more) risky portfolio.
5. If 2
3￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 3
2￿1; then, at the equilibrium, both agents have utility levels that are lower
than in the Walrasian setting. Otherwise, the utility level of the more risk tolerant agent
increases (with respect to the Walrasian setting) while the utility level of the more risk
averse agent decreases.
Note ￿rst that our construction of strategic beliefs leads to subjective and heterogeneous
optimal beliefs. Indeed, optimal strategic beliefs di⁄er from the objective belief, agents 1 and 2
di⁄er in their optimal belief and, as expressed in Equations (4), beliefs heterogeneity takes its
roots in the di⁄erence in risk aversion levels. Besides, more than just being "heterogeneous",
optimal beliefs are "antagonistic" in the sense that one of the agents is optimistic (b ￿i > ￿) and
the other one is pessimistic (b ￿i < ￿):
The pessimism of the more risk tolerant agent can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that
agent 1 is more risk tolerant. At the equilibrium, since agents initially only di⁄er in their level
of risk aversion, the risky asset￿s demand for agent 1 is positive. His expected utility from trade
is then decreasing in the price of the risky asset. The choice of a pessimistic belief is associated
to a lower demand, hence to a lower price and a higher expected utility. The optimal belief
balances this bene￿t of pessimism against the costs of worse decision making. The converse
11reasoning applies to agent 2, who, at the equilibrium, has a negative demand in the risky asset
and bene￿ts from optimism. Another way to interpret the pessimism of the more risk tolerant
agent is to analyze the situation in the neighborhood of the objective belief and the associated
equilibrium, i.e. the Walrasian equilibrium. Indeed, a deviation from the objective belief has
potentially two e⁄ects on the utility level: a quantity e⁄ect and a price e⁄ect. The quantity
e⁄ect is equal to zero due to the optimal quantity choice condition in the Walrasian equilibrium
and the price e⁄ect is positive for the less risk tolerant agent (i.e. the agent that has a negative
net demand) and is negative for the more risk tolerant agent.
As a consequence of the positive correlation between pessimism (optimism) and risk tolerance
(risk aversion), the more risk tolerant will insure the less risk tolerant less than in the standard
setting, which induces less risk-sharing.
The average (unweighted) belief is pessimistic, which means that the risk tolerant agent is
more pessimistic than the risk averse is optimistic. This result can be understood as follows.
As we have seen, the optimal belief results from an arbitrage between the bene￿t of a low price
induced by pessimism for the risk tolerant (resp. the bene￿t of a high price induced by optimism
for the risk averse) against the costs of worse decision making. Let us explore this point further.
At the Walrasian equilibrium, the marginal utility of the less risk tolerant agent associated to a
marginal increase of ￿ is positive and equal to the marginal utility of the more risk tolerant agent
associated to a marginal decrease of ￿. By de￿nition, the optimal beliefs correspond to zero
marginal utilities. When the more risk tolerant agent becomes more pessimistic and when the
less risk tolerant agent becomes more optimistic, their marginal utilities decrease at di⁄erent
rates. The di⁄erence between these two rates originates in the variance terms in the utility
functions and more precisely in the terms (￿￿1)
2 and (￿￿2)
2. Due to the market clearing
condition, these two terms are equal; however, by de￿nition of the risk tolerance coe¢cient,






in the utility functions. This leads to a slower
decrease of the marginal utility for the more risk tolerant agent and then to a more pronounced
divergence from the objective belief for that agent.
The consensus belief, which is given by the average of the individual beliefs weighted by the
risk tolerance, is then obviously pessimistic. Intuitively, the more risk tolerant agents make the
market, and the consensus belief re￿ects the characteristics of the more risk tolerant. Since we
have just seen that the more risk tolerant is pessimistic, it is consistent to obtain a pessimistic
consensus belief.
12The risk premium is greater than in the standard rational expectations equilibrium, which
is interesting in light of the risk premium puzzle. This is easily understandable, since, as we
have seen, in equilibrium models with heterogeneous beliefs the risk premium is higher than in
the standard setting if and only if the consensus belief is pessimistic. The reason why pessimism
increases the market price of risk is not that a pessimistic representative agent requires a higher
market price of risk. He requires the same market price of risk but his pessimism leads him to
underestimate the average rate of return of the risky asset. Thus the objective expectation of the
equilibrium market price of risk is greater than the representative agent￿s subjective expectation,
hence is greater than the standard market price of risk (see Abel, 2002, and Jouini-Napp, 2006).
To sum up, our construction of endogenous beliefs leads to optimal beliefs that are di⁄erent
from the objective belief, heterogeneous, and antagonistic (one is optimistic and the other
is pessimistic). There is a positive correlation between risk tolerance (resp. risk aversion) and
pessimism (resp. optimism), which leads to less risk-sharing. The consensus belief is pessimistic,
which leads to a higher equilibrium risk premium.
Our results are robust to variations in the initial endowments as long as the more risk
tolerant agent has a positive net demand, i.e. as long as the more risk tolerant agent insures
the less risk tolerant one, which is a natural situation. However, note that all the e⁄ects we
exhibited disappear when there is no aggregate risk (i.e. when the total supply in risky assets
is equal to zero). Indeed, in such a framework there is no trade at the Walrasian equilibrium
and there is then no price e⁄ect and no utility gain associated to a deviation from the objective
belief.
3 N-agents models and applications
The previous section focused on a 2 agents model in order to enlighten the impact of a strategic
behavior on equilibrium prices and risk-premium. In this section, we generalize previous results
to models with N agents. We ￿rst consider the case of small N for which the framework and
the results appear as a direct generalization of those of the section above. In a second step,
we consider a model with a large number of agents but with a small number of in￿uential
investors or gurus. In such a setting, gurus choose their beliefs strategically and the other
agents adopt one of the gurus announced beliefs. For credibility reasons, gurus act according to
their announced beliefs. Hence, even if their beliefs are not true beliefs, they will be considered
13as such by an econometrician/observer who analyzes portfolio choices. As far as the other agents
are concerned, they sincerely trust one of the gurus and they adopt his announced beliefs as
their own true beliefs. In such a model, restricting demand schedules manipulations to beliefs
manipulations is natural. Indeed, gurus modify their beliefs in order to manipulate others
beliefs. They have no speci￿c reason nor incentives to modify other parameters of their demand
schedules like the risk tolerance parameter or more generally the form of their utility function.
3.1 The case of a ￿nite number of agents
Let us consider a model a model with N agents, indexed by i = 1;:::;N: Each agent is endowed
with 1
N unit of the risky asset and we denote by ￿i the level of risk tolerance of agent i. We
denote by ￿ the risk tolerance of the representative agent, i.e. ￿ =
PN
i=1 ￿i:
If agent i chooses a belief ￿i; then his optimal trading quantity is given by ￿i (p;￿i) = ￿i
￿i￿p
￿2














which is the price in an economy with a representative agent (with risk-tolerance ￿), whose
belief is given by the average of the individual beliefs weighted by the risk-tolerance. The choice
of a belief b ￿i is then determined by the maximization of the utility level
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j6=i denotes the beliefs
chosen by the other agents, and are taken as given.
With this de￿nition we obtain the following result that is the analog of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in beliefs in the model with N agents.
It satis￿es the following properties.















￿ ; for i = 1;:::;N:
2. The unweighted average of the beliefs is pessimistic, i.e. 1
N
PN
i=1 b ￿i < ￿: More precisely,






















143. There is a positive correlation between pessimism and risk-tolerance, in other words the
more risk-tolerant agents are more pessimistic.
4. The representative agent is pessimistic, i.e. the average of the individual beliefs weighted






















5. The risk premium (resp. the price) is higher (resp. lower) than in the standard rational
expectations equilibrium. More precisely


























The concept of Nash equilibrium in beliefs with N agents is the natural generalization of
the concept with 2 agents.
The model with N agents leads then to optimal beliefs that are di⁄erent from the objective
belief, heterogeneous, and we still have both optimistic and pessimistic agents. The correlation
between risk tolerance (resp. risk aversion) and pessimism (resp. optimism) is still positive.
The consensus belief is pessimistic, which leads to a higher equilibrium risk premium.
There are two ways to analyze the impact of a growing number of agents on the equilibrium
parameters. We may consider the situation where we add new agents that are similar to the
initial ones or the situation where we consider a larger set of agents but maintaining the total
risk tolerance ￿ constant. In both cases, the optimal beliefs converge to the objective belief
and the risk-premium converges to the standard risk-premium. This result is natural, since
the impact of the individual belief on the equilibrium price decreases when the number of
agents increases. When N becomes large, each agent becomes price-taker and has no bene￿t
from a belief manipulation. In particular, if we consider an economy with a set of K agents
characterized by their risk tolerances (￿i)i=1;￿￿￿;K and if we consider the economy in which
agent i, i = 1;￿￿￿ ;K; is replaced by N agents each with a risk tolerance level ￿i
N, then the
characteristics of the strategic equilibrium in this economy with NK agents converge to the
characteristics of the Walrasian equilibrium in the economy with K agents.
This means that our results are particularly relevant in situations where there are a small
15number of agents. This is the case for ￿nancial markets when the capital is highly concentrated
or for assets that require a very high level of technicality. More generally, this is also the case in
all situations in which a small number of risk averse agents have to choose the optimal exposure
to a risk. For example, when an insurance company has to negociate an optimal retention rate
with reinsurance companies or when entrepreneurs have to ￿x the optimal proportion of equity
to retain for a given project. These problems lead to a bargaining situation in which each agent
tries to manipulate the equilibrium price by announcing a belief that is potentially di⁄erent
from his true belief and acts accordingly. Indeed, as in a standard bargaining situation for a
given good, the ￿buyer￿ will try to lower the price (by depreciating the good) while the ￿seller￿
will try to higher the price (by singing the praise of the good) and the resulting price will depend
on the relative bargaining power of the two individuals.
In the ￿nancial markets setting, our ￿ndings consist in an increase of the market price of risk
which is interesting in light of the risk-premium puzzle. In the insurance industry, our results
lead to a situation where the more risk averse agent (the insured) is optimistic and the less risk
averse agent (the insurer) is pessimistic. The average belief is pessimistic leading to a higher
insurance premium, which might help to explain the purchase of vastly overpriced insurance in
a range of situations (Cutler-Zeckhauser, 2004). In corporate ￿nance, IPO￿s can be modeled as
a decision for a risk averse entrepreneur to sell shares of his ￿rm to more risk tolerant investors.
The application of our results to such a setting leads to a pessimistic consensus belief. As a
result, the ￿rm is underpriced and the short run return is large, which is consistent with the
empirical literature on IPO￿s (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995).
3.2 Large number of agents: gurus and beliefs formation
As we have seen in the previous section, the impact of the strategic behavior vanishes when
the number of agents goes to in￿nity. However, as underlined by Shefrin (2005, p116) ￿the real
issue is not so much how much investors they are but to what extent investors cluster in their
beliefs￿.
We assume that there is a continuum of in￿nitesimal agents with risk tolerance levels ￿i for
i 2 [0;1]; where i ! ￿i is measurable. We also assume that there are, among these agents, N
in￿uential investors who have a wide audience. We do not assume that they have the capacity
to move the markets by their own trades but only that they have, through their wide audience,
the ability to largely in￿uence the other investors. We will call them gurus.
16Gurus announce their beliefs and act accordingly in order to maintain their credibility. As
in Benabou-Laroque (2001), we have in mind the "guru" who ￿issues forecasts or newsletters
but is also in the business of trading for his own account or some investment ￿rm￿.
The other agents in the economy do not have speci￿c information and believe that gurus are
well informed or have speci￿c ability to predict market movements. At a given date, based on
past realizations and gurus￿ recommendations, each agent has a preferred guru and adopts his
beliefs. There are then N groups of agents: the agents in Group i (Gi) follow guru i, i = 1;:::;N.
Let us assume that N = 2 and let us denote by ￿1 =
R
G1 ￿idi and by ￿2 =
R
G2 ￿idi the
aggregate risk tolerance in G1 and G2. We have ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿ where ￿ is the aggregate risk
tolerance in the economy.
Guru j, j = 1;2; announces a belief ￿j and this belief is adopted by all the agents in Gj:
The agents in Gj can then be aggregated into a representative agent with belief ￿j and risk




There is one unit of the risky asset in the economy and it is uniformly distributed among






The demand of guru j is determined, as usual, by his own level of risk tolerance denoted
and by ￿￿
j and by his announced belief ￿j: Indeed, gurus￿ demands are observable, hence they
act according to their announced beliefs in order to maintain their credibility.
The demand of guru j given price p is then given by ￿￿
j
￿j￿p
￿2 and his utility level at the





















Each guru chooses then optimally his belief, the belief of the other guru being given. The
two gurus participate then to a game characterized by payo⁄ functions (U1;U2) with parameters
(￿1;￿2;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) and look for a Nash equilibrium (￿1;￿2):
The other agents are able to observe market realizations and to compare them with gurus￿
predictions. In a repeated game and at a given stage of the game, they may choose the guru
that seems to be more accurate on the basis of previous stages and move from one group to
17another accordingly. In a steady state, we should then have
j￿1 ￿ ￿j = j￿2 ￿ ￿j:
In the next, we will say that the game (￿1;￿2;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) has a stable Nash equilibrium if we
have
j￿1 ￿ ￿j = j￿2 ￿ ￿j
at the equilibrium.
Finally, when j￿1 ￿ ￿j = j￿2 ￿ ￿j; agents should be indi⁄erent between guru 1 and guru 2.
Indeed, there is no speci￿c reason to choose one guru rather than the other one (or no reasons
that are related to the model). They should then choose each of the two gurus with a probability
1




G2 di = 1
2.
Proposition 3 Let us consider a model with a continuum of agents and two gurus. We denote
by ￿￿
1 > ￿￿
2 the risk tolerances of guru 1 and guru 2.
1. The game (￿1;￿2;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) has a unique Nash equilibrium (￿1;￿2):
2. If we assume that one guru is more risk tolerant than the average and that the other guru
is less risk tolerant than the average, i.e. ￿￿
1 > ￿ > ￿￿
2; then there exists a unique pair
(￿1;￿2) such that ￿1+￿2 = ￿ for which the Nash equilibrium is stable. This means that
there is a unique distribution of risk tolerance among Group 1 and Group 2 for which the
Nash equilibrium is stable.




2 or in other words if the gurus are
on average as risk tolerant as the agents in the economy then the more risk tolerant guru
(agent 1) is the more pessimistic one. Furthermore, group 1 has a higher aggregate risk
tolerance level, i.e. ￿1 > ￿2 and the more risk tolerant group is the more pessimistic one.




2 and if the two groups are of equal
size, then there is a positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance among the
whole population.
In other words, if the game we consider is part of a repeated game, then at a steady state we
should observe a situation where guru 1 is pessimistic and guru 2 is optimistic and where the
18aggregate risk tolerances (￿1;￿2) of group 1 and group 2 are such that the optimal strategy for
both gurus leads them to have the same level of accuracy with respect to the objective belief.
Furthermore, both groups have the same size. The agents have then no speci￿c reason to move
from one group to another and even if they choose their group randomly this will not lead
to a modi￿cation of (￿1;￿2): In such an equilibrium, there is a positive correlation between
pessimism and risk tolerance among the whole population.
This means that the strategic behavior may explain a higher risk premium when agents￿
cluster in their beliefs. This clustering property is, in particular, documented by Fisher and
Statman who claim that ￿there is a positive relationship between changes in the sentiment of
individual investors and that of newsletter writers￿.
4 Extensions and generalizations
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our results (heterogeneity of optimal beliefs, aggre-
gate pessimism, positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance, positive impact on
the risk premium) to other speci￿cations of the model. In particular, we consider extensions of
the simple model of Section 2 in the following directions; a model in which the strategic variable
is the variance (instead of the mean) of the payo⁄ of the risky asset, a model with more general
utility functions and distributions and a model with more than one risky asset.
4.1 Nash equilibrium in beliefs on the variance
In this section we consider a Nash equilibrium in beliefs where the agents di⁄er by their es-
timation of the variance of the risky asset. The ￿nancial model is the same as in Section 2
except that the strategic variable is now the variance of e x. The payo⁄ of the risky asset e x is still
normally distributed with mean ￿ and variance ￿2; but the agents can choose to behave as if
the variance was ￿2
i in order to maximize their utility from pro￿ts from trade. Here again, the
agents know the true distribution of e x; and the choice of a di⁄erent variance is only strategic.
In the competitive Walrasian equilibrium model, both agents agree on the true value of the
variance of the payo⁄ of the risky asset; as we have seen in Section 2, the optimal demand
of agent i; given the equilibrium price p; is given by ￿i (p) = ￿i
￿￿p
￿2 and the market clearing
condition ￿1 (p) + ￿2 (p) = 1 imposes that the equilibrium price of the risky asset is given by
p = ￿￿ ￿2
￿1+￿2.
19Let us ￿rst assume that agents have heterogeneous expectations about the payo⁄ of the
risky asset, i.e., agent 1 believes that e x has variance ￿2
1 and agent 2 believes that e x has variance
￿2
2 with ￿1 6= ￿2: The bias with respect to the objective belief can here be interpreted as a form
of doubt (￿2
i > ￿2) or overcon￿dence (￿2
i < ￿2) instead of the pessimism/optimism biases4 of




. It is then










that this price is the equilibrium price in an economy in which agents share the same belief,
namely the harmonic average of the initial beliefs, weighted by the risk tolerance. In other
words, it is the equilibrium price in an economy in which the belief of the representative agent
(whose risk tolerance is given by ￿, as in the standard setting) is given by the average of the
initial beliefs, weighted by the risk tolerance5. In this setting, the equilibrium risk premium is









; which means that the risk premium in an economy with
heterogeneous subjective beliefs is higher than in the standard rational expectations setting if








now analyze the properties of the optimal beliefs in the context of a Nash equilibrium in beliefs
on the variance.
We assume that the strategic variable for the agents consists in the variance of e x: The choice
of a belief b ￿i is then determined by the maximization of the utility level











i (￿i;b ￿j) = ￿i (p(￿i;b ￿j);￿i) and where b ￿j; for j 6= i; is considered as given.
De￿nition 2. A Nash equilibrium in beliefs on the variance is de￿ned as a pair of variance
strategies M = (b ￿1;b ￿2) such that for any other pair of strategies M0 di⁄ering only in the i-th






























Proposition 4 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in beliefs on the variance. It satis￿es
the following properties.
4See Abel (2002) for concepts of pessimism and doubt related to ￿rst and second order stochastic dominance.
5Walrasian equilibrium models in which agents have heterogeneous beliefs on the variance of the asset under
consideration have been studied by, among others, Abel (1989, 2002) and Jouini-Napp (2006).
















The more risk tolerant agent exhibits doubt, in the sense that he behaves as if the variance
of e x lied above its true value, and the less risk tolerant agent is overcon￿dent. Moreover,
the more risk tolerant agent exhibits more doubt than the less risk tolerant agent exhibits
























2. The representative agent exhibits doubt, i.e. the harmonic average of the individual beliefs



















3. The risk premium (resp. the price) is higher (resp. lower) than in the standard rational
expectations equilibrium. More precisely

















16￿1￿2 (￿1 + ￿2)
￿2:
The Nash equilibrium in beliefs on the variance has then the same properties as the Nash
equilibrium in beliefs on the mean except that pessimism is replaced by doubt. Note that
behavioral studies in a non strategic context generally exhibit overcon￿dence instead of doubt.
This bias is largely documented in the behavioral literature and in particular by Shiller (2000, p.
142): ￿Yet some basic tendency towards overcon￿dence appears to be a robust human character
trait: the bias is de￿nitely toward overcon￿dence rather than undercon￿dence￿. The strategic
framework induces then an e⁄ect in the opposite direction and this might explain that Giordani
and S￿derlind (2006) "￿nd little evidence of either overcon￿dence or doubt" in the survey of
professional forecasters. Indeed, professional forecasters know that their forecasts have a direct
as well as an indirect (their predictions in￿uence the beliefs of many other investors) impact on
prices and it is then natural for them to adopt a strategic behavior.
214.2 More general utility functions and distributions
The purpose of this section is to analyze the robustness of the results of Section 2 to more general






￿2K ; corresponding to
the possible subjective distributions for ~ x; where K ￿ R+ is a given set of admissible beliefs
(including the objective one). For ￿ 2 K; we let f(:;￿) denote the density function of P
￿
e x with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on R+:
As in Section 2, our economy is composed of two agents, initially endowed with a half unit
of the risky asset ~ x; who can manipulate their beliefs and choose an optimal composition of
their portfolio, taking into account the e⁄ect their trading has on price.
We make the following assumptions
Assumption (A)
￿ The utility functions u1 and u2 are increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously
di⁄erentiable on R+,
￿ Inada conditions: u0












0 f(s;￿0)ds for ￿0 ￿ ￿ in K:
￿ The functions s 7! su0
i(s); i = 1;2; are increasing.
The ￿rst condition is standard. The second one guarantees interior solutions to the indi-
vidual portfolio choice problem. The third condition ensures an order on the set of admissible






￿2R+ such that f(s;￿) = g(s ￿ ￿) for a given distribution function g on R+ satis￿es this




￿2R. The last condition guarantees that a ￿rst stochastic dominance shift in pay-
o⁄s increases the demand for the risky asset (see Gollier, 2001). The same property can be
obtained without this condition if we replace the ￿rst-stochastic dominance by the monotone
likelihood ratio order (Landsberger and Meilijson, 1990).
In the next, we also assume that all the considered expectations exist and are ￿nite. We
may assume without any loss of generality that the objective distribution corresponds to ￿ = 0
and we will simply denote by E (instead of E0) the associated expectation operator6.
6We let E
￿ denote the expectation operator under the density f(:;￿); i.e. E
￿ [g(e x)] =
R
g(s)f(s;￿)dx:
22As in Section 2, agents choose their beliefs which means here that they choose a given ￿
and its associated subjective distribution P
￿
e x for e x:
For a given belief P
￿











For a pair of beliefs (￿1;￿2); the equilibrium price p(￿1;￿2) is determined by the market-
clearing condition ￿1(p(￿1;￿2);￿1) + ￿2(p(￿1;￿2);￿2) = 1 and the associated optimal demand
for agent i is de￿ned by ￿￿
i(￿1;￿2) = ￿i(p(￿1;￿2);￿i): Finally, the optimal belief b ￿i of agent i



































Proposition 5 Under Assumption (A), the functions ￿i(p;￿); p(￿1;￿2) and ￿￿
i(￿1;￿2) are well
de￿ned and satisfy @￿i
@p (p;￿) ￿ 0; @￿i








@￿j ￿ 0; i = 1;2; j 6= i:
If the optimization program (11) admits an interior solution, then one of the agents (agent i)








If one of the utility functions (say u1) is more risk averse than the other one in the sense of
Arrow-Pratt, then ￿￿
1(￿1;￿2) ￿ 1
2; hence there is a positive correlation between pessimism and
risk tolerance.
We obtain ￿rst that the optimal demand of the agents (as a function of the price and the
belief) increases with the belief and decreases with the price, which are natural properties. As a
consequence, the equilibrium price increases with the beliefs, which is also natural; if the asset
is more ￿desirable￿, its equilibrium price increases. An increase in the belief of agent i has then
two e⁄ects on his demand ￿￿
i at the equilibrium, a direct positive e⁄ect and an indirect negative
e⁄ect due to the price increase. The global e⁄ect is positive. The e⁄ect of an increase of the
belief of agent i on the equilibrium demand ￿￿
j of the other agent is negative because there is
only one e⁄ect, namely the price e⁄ect.
23We obtain that heterogeneity of optimal beliefs is robust to the choice of more general utility
functions and distributions. Moreover, as in Section 2, one agent is optimistic and the other
agent is pessimistic. The pessimistic agent is the one for which the net demand is positive. This
result can be explained as before. For the agent who expresses a positive net demand for the
risky asset, the choice of a pessimistic belief is associated to a lower price and a higher expected
utility; the optimal belief balances this bene￿t of pessimism against the costs of worse decision
making. The converse reasoning applies to the other agent, who, at the equilibrium, has a
negative net demand in the risky asset and bene￿ts from optimism.
The positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance is also robust to this more
general setting. When one of the agents is more risk tolerant, his net demand is necessarily
positive. Otherwise, he would have a negative demand which would lead to an optimistic belief
while the other agent would be pessimistic, more risk averse with a positive net demand. This
is obviously impossible. The positive correlation follows.
4.3 The model with two risky assets
The model is essentially the same as in Section 2 except that we now suppose that there are two
risky assets in the economy, whose associated payo⁄s at the end of the period are respectively
denoted by e x and e y: We let p (resp. q) denote the price of e x (resp. e y) and we assume that e x and
e y are normally distributed, more precisely e x ￿ N
￿
￿;￿2￿
and e y ￿ N
￿
￿;$2￿
. We let ￿ denote
the correlation between e x and e y; i.e., ￿ ￿
cov(e x;e y)
￿$ : Each agent is initially endowed with one half
unit of each risky asset.
We assume that each agent can choose a belief, i.e. a pair (￿i;￿i) that maximizes his utility
from trade and as previously we look for a Nash equilibrum in beliefs (on the means). The
de￿nition and the notations are straightforward generalizations of those introduced in Section
2.
Proposition 6 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in beliefs. It satis￿es the following
properties.
1. The optimal beliefs M = ((b ￿i;b ￿i);i = 1;2) are given by






















￿(￿i ￿ ￿j) + $(￿j + 3￿i + 4￿￿i)
(￿ + 1)$￿
:
3. The risk premium (resp. the price) is higher (resp. lower) than in the standard rational
expectations equilibrium. More precisely
















where RPstdd(e x) and RPstdd(e y) denote the standard risk-premium for e x and e y in an
homogenous beliefs setting.
As far as the market portfolio is concerned, the market risk-premium RPM and the beliefs
￿M
i on the average market return are given by
￿M











where ￿ = ￿ + ￿ and ￿2
M = $2 + 2￿￿$ + ￿2 correspond respectively to the objective market
portfolio return and variance. These formulas are exactly the same as in the one asset framework
which means that the more risk tolerant (risk averse) agent is pessimistic (resp. optimistic) at
the aggregate level and the consensus belief is pessimistic at the aggregate level. The formulas
for individual assets that are provided in the proposition are similar to those obtained in the one
asset framework. However, for each asset, the variance term in the one-asset formula is replaced
by the covariance of the considered asset payo⁄s with the market portfolio payo⁄s. Recall that
in the Walrasian setting (CAPM setting), the equilibrium price for a given asset depends on the
covariance of the payo⁄s of this asset with the payo⁄s of the market portfolio and not on the
total variance of the asset payo⁄s. Since the agents modify their beliefs in order to manipulate
the prices, it is natural to obtain optimal beliefs that depend on the covariance with the market
portfolio and not on the total variance. The aggregate level properties (pessimism, correlation
between pessimism and risk tolerance,...) are then retrieved at the individual assets level as far
as these assets are positively correlated with the market portfolio.
25As in the one risky asset framework, the strategic behavior leads to less risk-sharing than
the Walrasian setting. It is interesting to note that this e⁄ect is more pronounced for the riskier
asset. Intuitively, the strategic behavior leads to more beliefs dispersion for the riskier asset
and hence to a more pronounced impact on the market for the riskier asset .
5 Strategic vs "optimal" beliefs
Let us compare our results with those that are obtained in an optimal non-strategic framework.
More precisely, adopting the same framework and notations as in Section 2, we consider the
following concept of optimal beliefs, which corresponds to a simpli￿ed version of Brunnermeier-
Parker (2005) and Gollier (2005).
De￿nition 3. For a given price p, an optimal (non-strategic) belief ￿i(p) for agent i is de￿ned









p + ￿i(p;￿i)(e x ￿ p)
￿￿
where Ei is the expectation operator associated7 to the belief ￿i and where K is a given set of
admissible values for ￿i that contains the objective belief ￿:
The belief ￿i(p) is optimal in the sense that it maximizes over the set K the well-being of
agent i: We can then de￿ne an associated equilibrium concept as follows.
De￿nition 4. An equilibrium price with optimal (non-strategic) beliefs is de￿ned as a price p
such that agents have optimal demands and optimal (non-strategic) beliefs and such that markets
clear, i.e.
￿1(p;￿1(p)) + ￿2(p;￿2(p)) = 1:
Let us assume that K = [a;b]:
Proposition 7 In the setting of the exponential utility and normal distributions, we have






2 ; then the equilibrium is characterized by p = b￿ ￿2
￿1+￿2 and ￿1(p) = ￿2(p) =
7More precisely, Ei is the expectation operator associated to a probability Pi that represents agents i
0s belief
and under which e x ￿ N(￿i;￿
2):





2 ; where ￿1 < ￿2; then the equilibrium is characterized by p = a+b
2 ;
￿1(p) = a and ￿2(p) = b: The more risk tolerant agent is the more optimistic and the
consensus belief ￿1a+￿2b
￿1+￿2 is more optimistic than the equally weighted belief a+b
2 : If the set
of admissible beliefs is symmetric with respect to the objective belief ￿ (i.e. ￿ = a+b
2 ),
then the consensus belief is optimistic and the risk-premium is lower than in the standard
setting.





￿1+￿2 where agent 1 is the less risk tolerant
one, there is no equilibrium. This is no more true if we consider the natural extension of our
model to a model with a continuum of agents. It su¢ces then to assume that a proportion ￿
of these agents choose the belief a and a proportion (1 ￿ ￿) choose the belief b: If we assume
that the distribution of beliefs is independent of the distribution of risk tolerances, the market
clearing condition leads to








The proportion ￿ is then perfectly determined if ￿2
R
￿idi ￿ b￿a
2 : The solution ￿ is always lower
than 1
2 which means that the consensus belief is always optimistic. This equilibrium in which
each agent is indi⁄erent between two possible beliefs and in which the market clearing condition
imposes the proportions of agents choosing each belief resembles the equilibrium obtained in
Brunnermeier-Parker (2005).
In fact, when the agents are not strategic and choose "optimal" beliefs, all agents are "opti-
mistic about their equilibrium allocation", i.e. overestimate the return of their portfolio. Indeed,
agents that are long in the risky asset choose a belief b and those that are short in the risky
asset choose a belief a leading them to overestimate the return of their portfolio. This bias is
induced by the way beliefs are constructed.
These results are analogous to those of Brunnermeier-Parker (2005) even if in their case
there is no aggregate risk8 and the function to be maximized is an average of the objectively
expected utility and the subjectively expected utility. It is easy to check that we would obtain
the same kind of results if we considered a weighted average of the objectively expected utility
8In this case, there is no absolute concept of optimism or pessimism and both agents are optimistic with
respect to their own equilibrium allocation.










p + ￿i(p;￿i)(e x ￿ p)
￿￿






p + ￿i(p;￿i)(e x ￿ p)
￿￿￿
:
For ￿ large enough, in other words when the weight on the objective expectation is beyond
a given threshold, then agents share the same belief and this belief is optimistic. Otherwise,
there is not a unique optimal belief, agents have extreme beliefs (i.e. a or b), but the possible
equilibria still lead to an optimistic average belief9. In all cases, the average optimal belief is
optimistic leading to a lower risk premium. These results are similar to those obtained by
Gollier (2005) in a general discrete distributions setting.
To conclude, in the optimal (non-strategic) setting, the consensus belief is always optimistic
and the risk premium is always lower than in the rational expectations setting. Furthermore,
except for speci￿c degenerate situations (see Equation 13), the agents share the same belief that
is optimistic. There is then no beliefs heterogeneity induced by risk tolerance heterogeneity.
The di⁄erence between optimal (non strategic) and strategic beliefs is now clear, since in the
latter setting, there is beliefs heterogeneity, one agent is optimistic while the other is pessimistic
and the consensus belief is pessimistic.
6 Conclusion
The introduction of strategic interaction in the standard portfolio/equilibrium model provides a
rationale for beliefs heterogeneity; it leads to optimal beliefs that are subjective, heterogeneous
and antagonistic. The selection of optimal beliefs is governed by very precise rules. First, these
beliefs must be related to the individual level of risk aversion: the beliefs of more risk averse
agents exhibit optimism and/or overcon￿dence and the beliefs of more risk tolerant agents
exhibit pessimism and/or doubt. As a consequence, there is a positive correlation between
pessimism/doubt and risk tolerance. Second, the average belief exhibits pessimism and/or
doubt as well as the belief of the representative agent. This is compatible with the observation
9More precisely, for ￿ <
1
2; the agents have extreme beliefs, a or b; as above and there might exist equilibria
with heterogeneous optimal beliefs if the model parameters satisfy a condition like condition (13). For ￿ >
1
2;
i.e. when there is more weight on the objective expectation, and if b is su¢ciently large (b > b
￿ for some b
￿) the
agents share the same belief and this belief is an interior point of [a;b]: For ￿ =
1
2 or for b ￿ b
￿ the agents share
the same belief b:
28that subjects in experimental and empirical studies exhibit a dose of pessimism (Wakker, 2001,
Ben Mansour et al., 2006, Giordani-S￿derlind, 2006). The experimental studies in a non-
strategic framework generally conclude to the presence of overcon￿dence. However there is little
evidence of overcon￿dence or doubt in ￿nancial markets empirical studies (Giordani-S￿derlind,
2006). This might be explained by a doubt e⁄ect due to the strategic behavior that cancels the
overcon￿dence bias. This induced pessimism/doubt of investors might be helpful to solve the
equity premium puzzle. It is also helpful to explain the purchase of vastly overpriced insurance
contracts or the large short run returns of IPOs.
This work suggests further investigation in several directions. First, in this paper we have
let aside information asymmetry and heterogeneity in order to focus on the impact of strategic
interactions on individual beliefs and from there on equilibrium prices and allocations. It
would be useful to consider a more general model including both a strategic use of private
information and a strategic choice of beliefs. It would be also useful to analyze how our results
can be transposed in a dynamic setting. In particular, in the gurus framework it would be
interesting to analyze in a dynamic setting how investors choose their guru and how they
might decide to move from one guru to another one. Finally, in this paper we have only
considered totally ordered families of possible subjective distributions for the risky asset payo⁄s.
In particular, all beliefs deformations can be interpreted in terms of pessimism/optimism or
in terms of doubt/overcon￿dence. It would be interesting to consider more general possible
deformations of the objective distribution. For instance, in a complete markets framework, it
should be interesting to take the set of all possible probability distributions as the strategic set
of the agents and analyze the type of deformations induced by the strategic behavior in this
setting.
Appendix Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
1. For chosen beliefs (￿i)i=1;2 ; the optimal demand for agent i is given by ￿i (p;￿i) = ￿i
￿i￿p
￿2 ,












The resulting expected utility from trade for agent i; given the belief ￿j of agent j, j 6= i; can
29be written






















where ￿i (￿1;￿2) = ￿i
￿i￿p(￿1;￿2)
￿2 :











This program is concave and the maximum is reached for ￿i such that dAi
d￿i (￿i) = 0: This
leads to
￿i =




We solve then for (b ￿1;b ￿2) and obtain Equations (4).
2. Straightforward using Equations (4).
3. Straightforward using 2. and the expression of the risk premium which, as seen in
Equation (3), is given in the setting with heterogeneous beliefs by

































5. The utility level U1 (b ￿1) given b ￿2 is given by
30U1 (b ￿1) = ￿1
b ￿1 ￿ p(b ￿1;b ￿2)
￿2 (￿ ￿ p(b ￿1;b ￿2)) +
1
2




























while the Walrasian equilibrium utility level is given by
































We obtain U2 (b ￿2) given b ￿1 as well as U2 (￿) similarly. The di⁄erence, for each agent, between
the Nash equilibrium utility level and the Walrasian equilibrium utility level is given by










2 (￿j ￿ ￿i)
2 (3￿j ￿ 2￿i)￿2:
It is clear then that both quantities are negative for 2
3￿2 < ￿1 < 3
2￿2:
Proof of Proposition 2











where p and ￿i both depend on ￿i and on (b ￿j)j6=i: They are given by ￿i = ￿i
￿i￿p






￿ c ￿j ￿ ￿2
￿ :
Setting dAi











































The previous equation can be written
Nb ￿i￿
2
= ￿2￿ ￿ N￿2￿i + N￿￿
2







































































￿ ￿i is pessimistic.




￿ b ￿i in (15) by its expression (8); we get that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium with strategic beliefs given by















￿ ; for i = 1;:::;N:
5. Using (7) and 4 we have
























































i=1 b ￿i is pessimistic. Moreover, we get that 1
N
PN




￿ b ￿i; which means
that there is a positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance.
Proof of Proposition 3







































1￿1 (￿1 + ￿2)
:
2. Let us assume that ￿￿
1 > ￿￿
2 and that j￿1 ￿ ￿j = j￿ ￿ ￿2j: This leads to ￿1 = ￿2 or to
32￿1 ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿2.













It is easy to check that F is decreasing on (0;￿) and that F(0) < 0 and F (￿) > 0 only if
￿￿
1 > ￿ > ￿￿
2: This last condition means that one guru is more risk tolerant than the average
while the other one is less risk tolerant than the average. Under this condition, the equation
F(￿1) = 0 admits only one solution in (0;￿):




2 or in other words that the gurus are on average





























we have ￿1 > ￿2 which means that Group 1 is more risk tolerant than Group 2. Let us
prove that Group 1is more pessimistic than Group 2 or equivalently that ￿1 ￿ ￿ < 0: We








































or that H (￿1) < 0: Group 1 and guru 1 are then more pessimistic then Group 2 and guru 2.
Pessimism and risk tolerance are then positively correlated at the gurus level.
4. If the two groups are of equal size, the average belief is then the objective belief. The
average risk tolerance in Group 1 (resp. Group 2) is then equal to 2￿1 (resp. 2￿2) and the
covariance between optimism and risk tolerance is then given by (￿1 ￿ ￿2)(￿1 ￿ ￿) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 4


















































33The optimal beliefs are then given by Equations (9): Equation (10) follows.











the more risk tolerant agent exhibits more doubt than the less risk tolerant agent exhibits
over￿dence.
2. Straightforward using Equations (9).
3. Immediate in view of 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
It is well known that due to Inada conditions, the demand function is characterized by the
following ￿rst order condition
E￿
￿
(~ x ￿ p)u0













(~ x ￿ p)u00
i (c(p;￿)) ￿ u0
i(c(p;￿))
￿











E￿ [(~ x ￿ p)2u0
i(c(p;￿))]
:
with c(p;￿) = ￿i(p;￿)(~ x ￿ p) + 1







(~ x ￿ p)u00






i(e c) ￿ ~ yu00








@p (p;￿) is negative. Furthermore, (~ x￿p)u0
i(e c) = 1
￿e cu0(e c)￿ 1
2
p
￿u0(e c) and is then increas-
ing. By the ￿rst-stochastic dominance property, we have @￿i












@￿i ￿ 0; i = 1;2:


















@p (p;￿2) ￿ 0:































@￿i ￿ 0, hence E [(X ￿ p(￿1;￿2))u0
i] ￿ 0: As
previously, by the ￿rst-stochastic dominance property we obtain ￿￿
i ￿ 0: Analogously 1
2 ￿
￿￿
i(￿1;￿2) ￿ 0 leads to ￿￿





2) is pessimistic (resp. optimistic):
If one of the utility functions (let us say u1) is more risk averse than the other one in the sense
of Arrow-Pratt, let us prove that ￿￿
1(￿1;￿2) ￿ 1
2: If this is not the case, we have ￿￿
2(￿1;￿2) ￿ 1
2
and agent 2 is optimistic while agent 1 is pessimistic. We have then
1
2
< ￿1(p(￿1;￿2);￿1) ￿ ￿2(p(￿1;￿2);￿1)
because agent 1 is more risk averse. Furthermore we have ￿2(p(￿1;￿2);￿1) ￿ ￿2(p(￿1;￿2);￿2)
because ￿2 is larger than ￿1: We would have then ￿￿
2(￿1;￿2) > 1
2 which contradicts our
assumption.
Proof of Proposition 6
1. As in the previous proofs, direct computations lead to the following equilibrium prices
and quantities in a Walrasian setting when agents are endowed with beliefs (￿i;￿i):
8
> > > > <













































p + ￿i (￿ ￿ p) +
1
2



















; j 6= i; as given: The maximization programs
under consideration are concave. Setting dAi
d￿i = dAi
d￿i = 0 leads to












which is the unique solution of the Nash equilibrium in beliefs. At the aggregate level (i.e.
b ￿i + b ￿i), we check that the more risk tolerant agent is pessimistic and the less risk tolerant is
optimistic. Besides, the more risk tolerant agent is more pessimistic than the less risk tolerant
agent is optimistic. These properties are inherited at the individual assets level as far as ￿2 +
35￿$￿ ￿ 0 and $2 + ￿$￿ ￿ 0:
2. and 3. Straightforward using the result of 1. as well as Equations (18).
Proof of Proposition 7




2p + ￿i(p;￿i)(e x ￿ p))
￿￿
with ￿i(p;￿i) = ￿i
￿i￿p
￿2 :
Then, for a given p; the agent maximizes ￿i
(￿i￿p)2
￿2 :
When p > a+b
2 ; all the agents have the same belief a and the equilibrium price, if it exists,
must satisfy p = a￿ ￿2
￿1+￿2 which is not compatible with the condition p > a+b
2 : When p < a+b
2 ; all
the agents have the same belief b and the equilibrium price, if it exists, must satisfy p = b￿ ￿2
￿1+￿2
which is compatible with the condition p < a+b
2 only if ￿2
￿1+￿2 > b￿a
2 : In this equilibrium all
agents are optimistic and the risk premium is lower than in the standard rational expectations
equilibrium. When p = a+b
2 ; both agents may choose the same belief b leading to an equilibrium
only if ￿2
￿1+￿2 = b￿a
2 : They may also choose di⁄erent beliefs. If agent 1 (resp. 2) chooses a (resp.










which implies that the more risk tolerant agent is the more optimistic one and furthermore
imposes a relationship between ￿2;￿1;￿2;a and b: If ￿ = a+b
2 and ￿1 < ￿2; then ￿1a+￿2b
￿1+￿2 > ￿.
This leads to a lower risk-premium.
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